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LOMA LINDA UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS

Volume 13, Number 1 (March 1997)

James Walters Publishes Book on Personhood
by Duane Covrig, MA
Assistant Professor of Ethical Studies at Loma Linda University
Some bioethicists are skilled at using complex philosophical and historical analysis. Other bioethicists are adept
at identifying the core values involved in a contemporary
issue. Still others write readable prose. Rare is the bioethicist who can do all of these well, and still rarer one who can
do them all well in the same place. James Walters' recently
released book, What Is A Person: An Ethical Exploration
(1997, University of Illinois Press), may be an example of
such rare scholarship.
At first, this may seem a bit overblown. That is what I
thought when I read Lawrence Schneiderman's forward to
Walters' book. He called this book "lucidly written," a book
with "subtlety and detail," an example of "civilized
discourse," which was both "gracious" and "fair," and
provided "unexpected discoveries" throughout. A bit
much, I thought, to say about a book on bioethics. Most of
the books in this field leave a lot to be desired. Popularity
often outpaces scholarship and quality in biomedical ethics.
It is rare to find a well-researched book that is not just
faddish. And when good scholarship does show up at the
bookstore it is often wrapped in sleepy prose. Walters' book
is a welcome exception, readable and well thought out.
Walters starts out where most good books should: with
a simple but meaningful question. Better a well-nuanced
question than a boring answer. The question, "What is a
person?" carries the reader. Each subsequent chapter
provides enough discoveries to clarify the issues and a few
of the answers to this question, but leads the reader with
more questions. This vehicle keeps Walters' book flowing.
The mechanics of the book are simple. Walters posits
two approaches to answering the question, "what is a
person?" He calls one "physicalism" and the other "personalism," giving historical antecedents and contemporary

examples for both. He then stakes his tent in the personalism camp, and nuances its strengths and a few of its
weaknesses in comparison to the physicalist camp. He
then revisits his earlier work on the moral claims of anencephalic infants and ties this previous theoretical work to
this religious-historical discussion. He then attempts to
extend his personalism arguments into new territory, such
as other issues in the end-of-life discussion, and even
talks about animal rights. In all of this, Walters remains
readable.
There is much in this book to appeal to a variety of
readers-a little history, a bit of theology, some wellcrafted philosophy, and even some social science and
explanations of medical protocols. A small section is
devoted to findings from his social science survey of
professional views on the use of anencephalic infants in
organ transplantation.
Available through your local bookstore or to order, call
1-800-545-4703. Price: $23.95. 0
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Prayer and Health Care: An "Altared" Responsibility
Presented at the 1995 Contributors Convocation in Ral/cho ll1irage, California
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Once upon a time there was a wise and wonderful
physician who knows his cancer is not likely to be beater
teacher who said that in prayer we not only commune with
back, a Christian who knows the final triumph belongs to
God but also find new strength-new virtue-for daily life.
the risen Christ. The dying man was visited by a hospital
I won't tell you whether that teacher was a theologian or
chaplain who asked how he was "coping." "Fine," he said
my mother, but that teacher's line is, if you will, the text for
in the fashion of all those replies by which people indicate
this talk.!
that they are doing reasonably well given their circumstances, and that they would rather not elaborate just now
I want simply to take this reminder of the significance
of prayer to the hospital and to all the places where we
on what those circumstances are. But this chaplain was
endure and care in the face of sickness, pain, and death. I
unwilling to accept such a reply. He inquired again about
want simply to suggest that in prayer we may find new
how the man was feeling, how he was managing, how he
strength-new virtue-for medical ethics, and that in
was dealing with the stress. Relentlessly he pressed on to
prayer we may find our responsibilities subtly altered and
questions about denial and anger and acceptance. But
decisively "altared."
finally he gave up with the suggestion that when the man
I say "simply," but the task I undertake may seem
was ready to discuss things, he should not hesitate to call the
daunting and un·promising. Modern medicine, after all,
chaplain. After the chaplain left, Coles' friend did get angry,
seems thoroughly "religion less, " and a technologically
not so much about his circumstances or his dying, but about
well-equipped hospital seems emblematic of a "world
the chaplain. The chaplain, he said, was a psycho-babbling
come of age." I take courage for this task in the simple fact
fool. And Robert Coles, the eminent Harvard psychiatrist,
that prayer is as common in hospitals as in churches, as
agreed. What his friend needed and wanted, Coles says, was
common in hospitals as bedpans. As noisily secular as
someone with whom to attend to God and to God's word,
modern medicine is, prayer is still commonplace. When
not someone who dwelt upon the stages of dying as though
people hurt and suffer, or when they are about to give birth
they were "Stations of the CrosS." 3
or die, we are likely to find them under the care of a physiMy concern today, however, is not that the church or its
cian and in a hospital-and praying. To be sure, sometimes
representatives will neglect or ignore talk of God for the
prayer is regarded as a technology of last resort in
sake of psycho-babbling talk about "stages" and "phases."
hospitals,2 but the simple fact that it is commonplace
My concern is rather with medical ethics, and with the
suggests that it is not unreasonable and it may be important
possibility that Christians will ignore or neglect the practice.
to ask how prayer might illumine our endurance of pain
of prayer for the sake of an impartial point of view and the
and suffering and our attentiveness to the sick and dying.
generic moral principles favored by medical ethicists.
It is conventional that lectures in medical ethics
Just imagine for a moment that the chaplain who visited
consider a case. So, consider this: in his Harvard Diary,
Coles' friend had been trained as an "ethicist" rather than
Robert Coles tells the story of a Catholic friend of his, a
as a therapist. Suppose he had been enlisted on some
hospital ethics committee and, there, taught a little Mill and
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"esperanto," a language he little understands and doesn't
really care to learn-not now as he lies dying at any rate.
He has decisions to make, to be sure, hard medical and
moral decisions about what should be done and what left
undone, but he wants to make them prayerfully, oriented to
God and to the cause of God, and not just with impartial
rationality.
N ow imagine something more: imagine that this chaplain-turned-ethicist hears of this patient's angry rebuke.
Imagine that he is stung by it, chastened by it, and that he
resolves to make one more visit to the room of Coles'
friend, this time to pray, perhaps to learn something from
the pious sick that he had forgotten under the instruction of
medical ethicists.
Let's go with him. "We have come to pray," we say.
Before we begin, however, we ask why prayer is so important to him. His reply, I imagine, would go something like
this: "It is important because I am a Christian and because
I long to live the Christian life, even in the dying of it, and
prayer is part of the Christian life. Indeed, it is, as John
Calvin said, the most important part, 'the chief exercise of
faith, '4 the part of the whole Christian life which cannot be
left out without the whole ceasing to be the Christian life.
And, as Karl Barth said, the Christian life is a life of prayer,
a life of 'humble and resolute, frightened and joyful invocation of the gracious God in gratitude, praise, and above
all, petition."'s
Well, perhaps his response would not go exactly like
that. Not very many people quote Calvin and Barth in their
hospital rooms-and very few Catholics. Perhaps his reply
would rather go something like this: "Prayer is important
because it is a practice of piety. As you know, chaplain, the
philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre defined a practice as a
'form of socially established cooperative human activity
through which goods internal to that form of activity are
realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of
excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive
of, that form of activity with the result that human powers
to achieve excellence and human conceptions of the ends
and goods involved are systematically extended."'6
Well, okay, probably not. But even if he has not memorized an important and difficult passage from MacIntyre's
After Virtue, even if he has never read a philosopher or a
theologian, he may still make a reply to which John Calvin,
Karl Barth, and Alasdair MacIntyre would nod their heads
and say, "Yes, that's what I meant."
He is a Christian. He has learned to pray in the Christian community. And in learning to pray, he has learned as
well the good intrinsic to prayer. He has learned, that is, to
attend to God, to look to God. And he has learned it not just
intellectually, not just as an idea. In learning to pray, he has
learned a human activity which engages his body as well as
his mind, his affections and passions and loyalty as well as
his rationality, and which focuses his whole self on God.
To attend to God is not easy to learn, or painless. And
given our habit of attention to ourselves and to our own
needs and wants, we frequently corrupt prayer. We corrupt
prayer whenever we turn it to a means to accomplish some
other good than the good of prayer, whenever we make of
it an instrument to achieve wealth or happiness, or life or
Update Volume 13, Number 1

health, or moral improvement. In learning to pray, Coles'
friend has learned to look to God, and after the blinding
vision, to begin to look at all else in a new light. In prayer
he does not attend to something beyond God, which Godor prayer-might be used in order to reach; he attends to
God. That is the good intrinsic to prayer.
In learning to pray, he has learned as well certain standards of excellence which belong to prayer and its attention
to God. He has learned reverence-the readiness to attend
to God as God and to attend to all else in his life as related
to God. He has learned humility, the readiness to acknowledge that we are not gods, but the creatures of God, cherished by God but finite and mortal and, yes, sinful creatures
in need, finally, of God's grace and God's future. He has
learned gratitude, a disposition of thankfulness for the
opportunities within the limits of our finiteness and
mortality to delight in God and in the gifts of God. Attentive to God, he has learned care; attentive to God, he grows
attentive to the neighbor as related to God. Looking to
God, he has learned hope, a disposition of confidence and
courage that comes not from trusting oneself and the little
truth one knows well, or the little good one does well, but
from trusting the grace and power of God. These standards
of excellence form virtues not only for prayer but for daily
life-and for medicine. The prayer-formed person-in the
whole of her being and in all of her doing-will be reverent,
humble, grateful, caring, and hopeful. One does not pray in
order to achieve those virtues. They are not formed when
we use prayer as a technique. But they are formed in simple
attentiveness to God and they spill over into new virtues for
daily life. "That's why prayer is so important to me," Coles'
friend might conclude. "That's why I called it the 'chief
exercise of faith, '" Calvin might say. "That's why I said the
Christian life was 'invocation,'" Barth might say. "That's
what I meant by a 'practice,'" MacIntyre might add.
So, we are ready, finally, to pray with Coles' friend.
"But how shall we begin?" we ask, and Coles' friend
replies, "With invocation, of course, for prayer is to call
upon God and to adore God as the one on whom we
depend. To call upon God is to recall who God is and what
God has done. We invoke not just any old god, not some
nameless god of philosophical theism, not some idolatrous
object of someone's 'ultimate concern,' but the God
remembered in religious community and in other practices
of piety. Invocation is remembrance, and remembrance is
not just recollection but the way identity and community
are constituted. So we invoke the God made known in
mighty works and great promises, and as we do we are
oriented to that God and to all things in relation to God.
We invoke God as creator, and as we do, we learn to
make neither life nor choice, for nothing God made is god.
That is a good and simple gift to medical ethics, when talk
of "the sanctity of life" would require our friend to make
every effort to preserve his life, and when "respect for
autonomy" would prohibit every moral question besides
"Who should decide?" We invoke God as creator, and as we
do, we learn as well not to turn our back to life or to choice,
for all that God made is good. That, too, is a good and
simple gift to medical ethics when one doctor would kill or
when another would exercise some arbitrary power to keep
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Coles' friend alive. We invoke God as creator, and as we do,
we learn to refuse to reduce the embodied selves God made
either to mere organisms or merely to their capacities for
agency. And resistance to both forms of reductionism is a
gift to medical ethics both at the beginnings and at the
endings of life, and in all the care between as well.
Then we invoke God as provider. We do so in remembrance that God has heard the cries of those who hurt, that
God has cared. We do so in remembrance of one who
suffered and died, and we attend to that cross as the place
where the truth about our world was nailed. The truth
about our world is the horrible reality of suffering and
death. The truth about our world is the power of evil in the
story of a cross and in the myriad of sad stories others tell
with and of their bodies. The truth about our world is dripping with blood and hanging on a cross-but the same cross
that points to the reality and power of evil also points to the
real presence of God and the constant care of God.
Invocation and remembrance do not deny the sad truth
about our world or about our friend; they do not provide any
magic charm against death or sickness; they do not provide
a tidy theodicy to "justify" God and the ways of God. But
by attention to this God, we may learn that God cares, that
God suffers with those who hurt, even in places no medicine can touch. Then our friend-and every patient-may
be permitted to cry out, "God, why?" and still be assured he
is not abandoned by God. And the rest of us may be formed
by such prayer to embody care even when medicine cannot
cure, to be present to the sick even when our powers to heal
have failed, and to resist the temptation to abandon the one
who reminds us of our weakness-and the great weakness
of our great medical powers.
Such prayer is not an alternative to medicine, not a
technology of last resort; rather, it forms and sustains, as a
standard of excellence in medical practice, simple presence
to the sick and a refusal to abandon them to their hurt.
Such prayer-formed medicine will not always triumph over
disease or death, but it will always gesture care in the midst
of them and in spite of them.
We invoke God, too, as redeemer and as healer. We
make such invocation, too, of course, in remembrance of
Jesus, and in the hope of the good future that he made real
and present by his works of healing and words of blessing,
which God made sure by raising him from the dead. As we
invoke this God, as we attend to the redeemer, as we orient
ourselves to the healer in prayer, we orient all of life and our
medicine-along with our prayers-to God's promise and
claim. So, a prayerful people and a prayer-formed medicine
will celebrate and toast life, not death, but be able to
endure even dying with hope. A prayerful people and a
prayer-formed medicine will delight in human flourishing,
including the human flourishing we call health. They will
not welcome the dwindling of human strength to be
human, including the loss of strength called sickness; yet,
they can endure even that in the confidence that God's
grace is sufficient.
A prayer-formed community will not despise medicine,
as if to turn to medicine were to turn against God and God's
grace. Medicine is a good gift of God the creator, a gracious
provision of God the provider, and a reflection and servant
4

of God the redeemer. To condemn medicine because God
is the healer would be like condemning government
because God is the ruler, or condemning families because
God is "Abba." Or course, if medicine presumes for itself
the role of faithful savior or ultimate healer, then its arrogance may be and must be condemned. Perhaps Coles'
friend, like other good and honest doctors, is less tempted
than many patients to idolatrous and extravagant expectations of medicine. But invocation of God as redeemer
should free us all from the vanity and illusion of wielding
human power to defeat mortality, or eliminate human
vulnerability to suffering. An honest prayer could let the air
out of inflated medical promises and restore a modest
medicine to its rightful place alongside other measures that
protect and promote life and health, like good nutrition,
public sanitation, a clean environment, and the like.
Having made invocation, we pause to ask whether we
should continue. Coles' friends says, "yes," and we ask
"how?" "With prayers of confession, of course," he says.
"Those oriented to God are reoriented to all else; it is
called, I think, metanoia, a turning, repentance." It seems
clear to us that we have no major league sinner here, but we
humor him. "What would you confess?" we ask. "Are you a
smoker?" "That, too," he says, "but I see a reflection of my
life in my doctor, and I don't like it. I have been where she
is, angry at the patient who refuses another round of
therapy, angry at my own powerlessness to save him, eager
to use my authority as a physician to convince him to try
again, and eager to avoid him when he refuses to try again
or dies before we can. It is no great callousness I confess; '
it is the failure to acknowledge the fallibility and limits of
medical care." "And now I find myself where my patients
have been, and I don't like it much better-angry at the
doctor who cannot deliver a miracle, judging her much too
quickly and severely, angrier still that she would try to tell
me how to live while I am dying, eager to render her still
more powerless and optionless. It is no great callousness I
confess here either; it is the failure to acknowledge the
fallibility and limits of my own autonomy."
Confession is good for the soul, of course, but it's also
good for medical ethics. It helps us see the fallibility of
both medicine and patients. It helps us recognize the evil
we sometimes do in resisting evil, the harm we sometimes
inflict in the effort to banish suffering and those who
remind us of it. A prayer of confession, this form of attention to God, may help the dying turn from despising the
doctor because the doctor is a reminder of his sickness and
mortality. And it may help the doctor turn from the disposition to abandon the patient because the patient is a
reminder of her powerlessness to save him, and to turn
from any readiness to eliminate suffering by eliminating
the sufferer.
A prayer of confession may form the possibility of a
continuing conversation. When the assertion of authority
by a physician would ordinarily have put a stop to an argument and reduced the patient to manipulable nature, a
prayer of confession may enable the conversation to
continue. And when the assertion of autonomy by a patient
would ordinarily have put a stop to a discussion and
reduced the physician to an animated tool, a prayer of
Update Volume 13, Number 1

confession may enable the conversation to continue. We
may at least talk together longer and listen to each other
better, if in confession, we turn from the pretense of being
either final judge or final savior, for we are formed by
prayers of confession to be critical without condescension
and helpful without conceit. And that is a good and simple
gift to medical practice and medical ethics.
"There are prayers of thanksgiving to be made, as
well," our friend says, and he begins to mention gifts great
and small. And not the least among the gifts for which he
gives thanks are opportunities to fulfill some tasks, great
and small. He thanks God for a little time to be reconciled
with an enemy, and for enough relief from pain for the tasks
of fun with the family. He gives thanks for the opportunity
and the task of being a witness, a "martyr" he says, to
demonstrate even in his dying that some things are more
important than mere survival, and that many things are
more to be feared than death. There is a gift here to medicine and to medical ethics in the simple and joyful acknowledgement that the sick and dying are still living, that they
may not be reduced to the passivity of their sick role, and
that their choices may not be regarded simply in terms of
the arbitrary self-assertiveness of their autonomy. The sick
and dying have tasks and opportunities which must be
considered both by themselves and their caregivers.
Prayers of thankfulness form us and move us to seek the
neighbor's good. Prayers of thankfulness can form medical
practice, too. The ideal of much medical practice is philanthropy; the virtue of much medical practice is beneficence.
q'his is not to be despised, for it commends to the physician
love for humankind that issues in deeds of service. But it
divides the human race-and a hospital-into two groups:
the relatively self-sufficient benefactors and the needy
beneficiaries. Prayers of thanksgiving provide a different
picture and different relations, a world-and a hospital-in
which each is recipient of a gift, in which human giving is
put, as Bill May says, "in the context of primordial
receiving. "7 Prayers of thanksgiving also commend and form
deeds of love and service, but not as a self-important conceit
of philanthropy-rather as little deeds of kindness which are
no less a response to gift than the prayers of thanksgiving
themselves.
There is very little time when we turn finally to petition, and we apologize a little, but our friend will have no
apologies. "Prayer is not magic," he says, "it is not a way to
put God at my disposal. It is the way to put myself at God's
disposal. It is not a technique to get what I want, whether a
fortune or fourteen more healthy years. It is not a spiritual
technology to be pulled out as a last resort when medical
technologies have failed. Prayer is not a means, not even a
means to make God present. It attends to God, and as it
does, it discovers in memory and hope that God is present.
To treat prayer as a means to some other good than the good
that belongs to prayer makes prayer a superstition and trivializes God into some great 'scalpel in the sky. "'8 "May we
not then make petition together?" we ask, a little shocked.
"Of course we can," he says, "but carefully, for here it is easy
to attend to ourselves rather than to God, and to our wishes
rather than to God's cause."
So we form our petitions on the model of the one to
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whom we attend. We pray-and pray boldly-that God's
name and power may be hallowed, that God's kingdom may
come, that God's good future will be established "speedily
and soon," in this man's own lifetime. And because that
good future is already established, we pray-and pray
boldly-as the Lord taught us, for a taste of that future, for
a taste of it in such ordinary things as everyday bread and
everyday forgiveness, in such ordinary things as tonight's
rest and tomorrow's life, in such mundane stuff as the workings of mortal flesh and the healing of our embodied selves.
But because that good future is not yet-still sadly not
yet-we pray no less boldly for the presence of the one who
suffers with us, the one who hurts in our pain. And in petition most boldly of all, we offer ourselves ("altar" ourselves)
to be some gesture of God's good future and caring presence.
Attentive to God, both our petitions and our deeds
must be governed by the cause of God. Death, for example,
is not the cause of God. In the good future of God death
will be no more. Attending to God rather than to ourselves,
to God's cause rather than to our own wishes, we are
unlikely to bring a petition for death to our lips. Until that
good future comes, however, there will sometimes be good
reasons to cease praying for a patient's survival, and surely
peace and relief from pain belong to God's cause and may
be our petition and our intention. Attending to God in
confident hope of God's final triumph frees us from desperately holding on to this life, frees us to let go of it, leaving
it in the hands of the one who can be trusted.
Perhaps only a prayer-formed person will see an important moral difference, if not between praying for someone's
death and ceasing to pray for someone's survival, then at
least between killing and allowing to die, between
intending death and letting go a desperate hold on life. It
seems increasingly difficult to make that distinction in
moral "esperanto," whether the language chosen is utility
or autonomy.
Doctors and nurses make intercession, too, of course, as
well as patients. They make petition for those for whom
they care, and over whom they exercise responsibility. The
conscientious doctor and nurse, especially the ones who
take themselves too seriously and regard themselves
messianically, will be tempted to make prayer a means
again, a supplementary technology, to insure the effectiveness of their own work. But such a prayer is no less
corrupted into superstition because the petitioner is a
medical practitioner, and "God" is no less trivialized as the
"great scalpel in the sky" because the bloody hands of a
surgeon are lifted up in such a prayer.
Prayers of intercession and petition, this form of attention to God, not ourselves, can and sometimes do, and
should form an altered sense of responsibility (and an
"altared" sense of responsibility). In petition, the doctor or
the nurse hands the one under their care over to the hands
of God.
In making petition, medical practitioners let go of the
anxious control they have conscientiously assumed. The
doctor who prays seriously for a patient can take herself a
little less seriously. In making petition, the medical practitioner learns again that she is not Messiah, and she is freed
5

from the intolerable burden of inaugurating God's good
future fo r the patient. She can freely acknowledge the
limits of the art and her own limits. The doctor who prays
seriously fo r a patient will be formed to provide the best
care she can, of course, but she no longer anxiously substitutes for an absent God. In making petition, the medical
practitioner learns again a carefree care. And in that
"altared" sense of responsibility, we lay the best medical
skills and the worst medical cases before God with bloody
hands and lift them up in prayer.
"One final word," Coles' friend says. "We said before
that prayer-formed people will not despise medicine. It
may also be said that a prayer-formed people will not
despise medical ethics, either. Only let it pray now and
then. Prayer is not magic for decisions either. It is not a
technique to get what I want, even when what I want is an
answer or a solution to a dilemma rather than a fortune or
fourteen more h~althy years. It is not a technology to be
pulled out as a last resort when medical ethics has failed to
tell us clearly what we ought to do. It does not rescue us
from moral ambiguity. Part of what we know to be God's
cause may still conflict with another part of what we know
to be God's cause. You will still have to work hard,
attending to cases, sorting out principles, identifying the
various goods at stake, listening carefully to different
accounts of the situation. Prayer does not rescue you from
all that, but it does permit you to do all that in ways that are
attentive to God and attentive, as well, to the relations of

all that to God."
In prayer we not only commune with God but find new
strength-new virtue-for daily life, and an "altared"
responsibility for medicine and medical ethics.

REFERENCES:

(

1 T he line, I'm sure, could be credited to my mother and to many other pious
Christians. It-or something like it-has been said not just "once upon a time"
but again and again and time after time in the Christian tradition. I cite,
however, the theologian Henry Stob, "God and Man," in his Ethical Reflections. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979. This talk is drawn from remarks I
prepared as the Stob Lecturer at Calvin College and Seminary in 1992.
2 This is a risk in the renewed attention to the "therapeutic effects" of prayer; see,
for example, Dossey, Larry. Healing Words: The Power and the Practice of Medicine. New York: Harper Collins, 1993.
3 Coles, Robert. "Psychiatric Stations of the Cross." Harvard Diary: Reflections on
the Sacred and the Profane. New York: Crossroad, 1990.
4 Calvin, John. Institutes of the Christian Religion. Ed., John T Mcneill, trans., Ford
Lewis Battles. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960.
5 Barth, Karl. The Christian Life: Church Dogmatics IV 4. trans., Geoffrey Bromiley;
Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1981.
6 Macintyre, Alasdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Notre Dame: Notre
Dame Up, 1981.
7 May, William F. "Images That Shape the Public Obligations of the Minister,"

Bulletin of the Park Ridge Center 4: 1. (1989): 20-37.
8 May, William F. The Physician's C(JVenant: Images of the Healer in Medical Ethics.

Allen Verhey, PhD
Hope College
Holland, Michigan

Conference Report on "Bioethics and Human Destiny:
Jewish and Christian Perspectives"
by Cynthia Bilbrough, BA
The conference, Bioethics and Human Destiny: Jewish and
Christian Perspectives, was developed to encourage discussion
of the ultimate future of humans. Twelve renowned scholars
from varying faith traditions were invited to re-examine the
relevant teachings of their own faith on eschatology, to share
those teachings with each other, and to apply those teachings
to their own lives and chosen professions.
The conference opened on Sunday, February 2, 1997, at
the Arrowhead Springs Conference Center in San
Bernardino, California. The first speaker was Dr. John
L antos, associate professor of pediatrics and associate
director of the MacLean Center for Clinical Medical Ethics
at the University of Chicago. Dr. Lantos centered his presentation on the case of a 17-year-old Orthodox Jewish girl with
vaginal cancer. T he recommended treatment, a hysterectomy, would have left the girl infertile. Jewish law mandates
that treatment is obligatory yet the girl still refused treatment. However, after the girl's rabbi told her that if God
wanted her to have a baby, she would, she consented to the
treatment. D r. Lantos takes the position that medicine is a
moral enterprise and, therefore, should go beyond the technical aspects of treatment. He hopes to be more like the
rabbi in his thinking and encourages all of medicine to do so
as well.
Marsha F owler, a professor at Azusa Pacific University,
spoke on "Bioethics in the 'Nous.'" Dr. Fowler asserted in
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her presentation that constructive thought must do more
than reclaim our embodiness as terra animata. She believes
that we must seek to restore a notion of humanity as terra
animata coram deo, bringing together our theology and our
piety/spirituality. Dr. Fowler concluded that once we restore
a notion of the life of faith as one of animated earth before
God, the religious voice can speak for and to both the theoretician and the recipient of care.
Rabbi Elliot Dorff addressed the role of hope in Jewish
bioethics. Rabbi Dorff is rector and professor of philosophy
at the University of Judaism in Los Angeles, California. He
concluded that, in Jewish law, God is the moral compass,
judge, and enforcer, and illness is one of the punishments
God inflicts for sin. This aspect of Jewish theology can
undermine the hope of the ill. However, God is also the
Healer, and that can buttress the hope of the sick. Balancing
these perspectives is the ongoing task not only of Jewish
theologians, but also of rabbis and other Jews as they
minister to the sick. God commands Jews to save people
from harm, providing healing, when possible, as an agent
and partner with God. Furthermore, since God owns thF
bodies of Jews throughout life-and even in death- it is titobligation of every Jew to preserve health when possible.
The final speaker on Sunday was John B. Cobb Jr.,
emeritus professor at the Claremont School of Theology and
co-director of the Claremont Center for P rocess Studies. Dr.
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Cobb's presentation on Christian eschatology concentrated
mainly on concern for God's will to be done on earth, and
the belief in life after death. Dr. Cobb believes it would be
~etter for humans to discern what God is doing instead of
hiving for control over life. The struggle against death has
become inappropriate for many people. The dread is no
longer of death, but of continued life beyond its natural term
in a condition rendering it meaningless and burdensome. If
we can discern God working in the world, we may be able to
work with God to achieve His purposes. This may lead us to
seek to define the natural term of life and the nature of a
good death as the completion of such a life. Dr. Cobb hopes
this will guide medical research and practice in new directions.
Beginning the Monday presentations, Roy Branson,
senior research fellow at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at
Georgetown University spoke about "Visions of Justice and
the Healing of Nations." Dr. Branson believes both healing
and biomedical ethics take place only if there is an encompassing vision. Ethics of virtue and obligation are necessary,
but beyond that, people must glimpse a moral vision-a
horizon of imagination that draws communities from perception of facts to concerted action. Without a vision, the question, ethics, and a moral community perish.
The next presenter, l\tfargaret Mohrmann, Associate
Professor of Pediatrics and lecturer in religious studies at the
University of Virginia, spoke about attitudes toward the
suffering and death of children, and how those attitudes
reveal assumptions and beliefs about human destiny
')mmon to people both within and without organized reli6ion. The death of a child is regarded differently from that
of an elderly person. The mourning is for something more
than the loss of a loved person; it is partly for the loss of an
important piece of our own future, our own destiny. The
intricate entanglements of the destinies of child, parent, and
physician that come into play at times of pediatric medical
crisis may be impossible to uncoil fully, but explicit attention to the confusion seems at least a minimal requirement
for ethical medical practice and, therefore, for bioethics.
Theology also needs to call bioethicists to question the
moral weight of argument based on a presumed human need
to live a "full" life.
Alan Verhey, the Evert J. and Hattie E. Blekkink
Professor of Religion at Hope College, was the next speaker.
Dr. Verhey spoke on the topic, "Resurrection and the
Redemption of our Bodies: Toward a Watchful Medicine."
Medicine resists death. It creates a language, but not necessarily the language of the patient; and if the patient doesn't
speak this language, then he or she feels alienated. Death
threatens our relationship with God, making us feel like
abandoned children. The last word belongs to death, so we
are right to be fearful of it. However, Christians believe that
the last word belongs to God. Life is not the ultimate good.
Christ walked willingly into suffering, therefore we should
~ot be afraid to suffer as well. Watchfulness in medicine will
.ring a more carefree care.
Sidney Callahan spoke next on the topic, "Faith,
Suffering, and a Good Death." Dr. Callahan is an author,
psychologist, and professor of psychology at Mercy College.
She contends that the convictions of Christian ethicists on
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the meaning of necessary suffering can be conveyed to
others. While Christian faith may make death and suffering
more of an affront to human beings believed to be destined
for eternal life, the meaning and values of solidarity accorded
to suffering in Christian faith may be recognized and appreciated by all reasonable human beings of good will facing the
inevitable suffering of the dying process.
"People of the Land, People of the Spirit" was the topic
of the next speaker, Karen Baker-Fletcher. Dr. BakerFletcher is Associate Professor of Theology and Culture at
Claremont School of Theology, and Associate Professor of
Religion at Claremont Graduate School. She believes that
bioethics and social ethics are deeply interrelated. This is
particularly clear in the area of "environmental racism,"a
term coined by the Reverend Benjamin Chavis, to describe
the racialized hierarchy of environmental abuses. Dr. BakerFletcher wants us to recognize that we are all people of the
land and people of God-people of dust and Spirit. Therefore, we are responsible for acting out a holistic, inclusive
love for humanity and the earth, for society and the planet.
David Feldman, Director of The Jewish Center of
Teaneck in New Jersey, followed. Dr. Feldman, spoke about
physician-assisted suicide. He contends that our duty is to
do everything that is merciful, which includes pain medication that incidentally shortens life, but to do nothing that
intentionally ends life. Only the Creator takes life. Our
compassion for the patient should show us that we need to
spare the patient the burden of choice. Once the choice to
live or die is ours, so is the duty, so is the pressure to make
the choice to die, and so is the guilt for not having done so.
The mercy we might show to those who ask to die entails a
lack of mercy for the far greater number whose psyches
would be affected by the new burden of choice.
Miroslav Volf was the next presenter. He spoke on the
topic, "Healing and the Expectation of the End." Dr. Volf
teaches at Fuller Theological Seminary in Pasadena, California. He sought to explore, theologically, the relationship
between healing and beliefs about the nearness of "the
promised end." He focused upon two notable features of
Jesus' ministry in their interrelation-the proclamation of
the nearness of the eschatological reign of God, and the practice of healing the sick. He also examined the eschatological
dimension of Jesus' death and resurrection, and the relationship of these themes to healing.
The final speaker was Kevin O'Rourke, professor of
health care ethics and Director of the Center for Health Care
Ethics at Saint Louis University Health Sciences Center. Dr.
O'Rourke spoke on the topic, "Using or Foregoing Life
Support: The Catholic Tradition." Catholics believe that we
are stewards of human life, not owners. Life is not the ultimate good. For medical treatment to be obligatory, it must
be effective at prolonging life and not excessively burdensome. Dr. O'Rourke encourages people to define the ultimate goal of life support. For a treatment to be judged ineffective, it must leave the patient incapable of loving God,
others, and himself. \')

Cynthia A. Bilbrough, BA
Recent Graduate, University of Virginia
Severna Park, Maryland
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Tour leader is Charles Teel, Jr.
Adjunct Professor of Ethical Studies
Lorna Linda University
(Dr. Teel has researched and published extensively
on indigenous education in the Peruvian highlands
and has led fully one dozen study tours to Peru.)

Information
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